Re-secure Sybil Protection

I’d like to open a discussion in anticipation of posting a proposal to adjust governance parameters — specifically, the deposit amount required to submit proposals.

The rationale is straightforward: proposal deposits exist to give the NoWithVeto vote the power to function as a Sybil protection mechanism. When BLD traded at higher price levels, the current deposit amount served that purpose effectively. Historically, the deposit has represented roughly the BLD equivalent of US$500 — sufficient to deter most bad-faith or spam proposals. At current token prices, however, the cost of submitting a frivolous proposal is negligible.

My suggestion is to increase the proposal deposit from its current level of 5,000 BLD to 100,000 BLD. While this remains well below the historical US$500 benchmark, I believe it is high enough to provide meaningful protection against spam while remaining accessible to good-faith participants.

I welcome the community’s thoughts and feedback.

5 Likes

Yes please. Anyone with a legit governance proposal can easily find sponsors in the ecosystem if needed, so this should not be an obstacle independent governance activity. But it provide some obstacle to the kinds of scam governance attacks that have been going around.

5 Likes

I think 50,000 is enough. 100,000, and if the token price moves up, you’ll quickly surpass $500.

I think somewhere in that 50,000-100,000BLD is reasonable.

I agree with Ric’s argument regarding the 100,000 BLD. Personally, I would have suggested an even higher increase to prevent abusive proposals.

1 Like

Sponsorship helps but it changes the game.
Before: you could propose, then convince people.
After: you must convince people first just to propose.
So it doesn’t remove barriers it shifts them from capital to influence.
In practice, that means validators and large holders become gatekeepers.
It reduces spam, yes—but also risks filtering out new voices. 25,000 BLD would be reasonable to me.

That’s also my concern. With a thin community, sponsorship can cluster around like-minded groups, so proposals get pre-filtered by networks instead of debated openly. I support raising the deposit, but not to a level where access depends on who you know. A middle ground or dynamic threshold might reduce spam without narrowing participation.

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To strike a balance between accessibility for genuine users and resilience against Sybil attacks, I suggest targeting an effective threshold in the 25,000–50,000 BLD range.

Many holders have less money due to the drop in the token, but there are no new users. Therefore, in my opinion, 50,000 would be more logical.