While the paper is presented as a “new tokenomics” proposal, it is important to clarify that what is being introduced is primarily a new usage and fee model for BLD, not a fundamental change to its tokenomics.
From a tokenomics perspective, there are no material changes to inflation, issuance, total or circulating supply, vesting, or systematic burn mechanisms. These are the core levers that define tokenomics in the strict sense.
Redefining how the token is used is valuable, but utility alone is not sufficient to address long-term value capture if supply-side dynamics remain unchanged. Without clear adjustments to emission, inflation control, or mandatory value-accrual mechanisms, the risk of continued dilution remains.
For this reason, a true tokenomics update is urgently needed, one that explicitly addresses supply dynamics and aligns long-term token value with network growth — not only through usage, but through measurable and enforceable monetary policy.
I want to be very clear about the core issue: what we urgently need is not only better token usage, but decisive tokenomics changes.
Today, BLD is trading at ~$0.004 with a circulating supply close to 700M and a total supply above 1B. At these levels, continued inflation and staking emissions create constant sell pressure, especially from large holders who have already accumulated substantial amounts of BLD through rewards and are now selling at very low price levels.
Relying solely on future usage to absorb this pressure is risky. If usage does not materialize fast enough — or at sufficient scale — we remain in the same position: low price, low liquidity, and constant dilution
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I strongly believe the following changes should be seriously considered:
Make supply strictly finite.
Burn tokens to set the maximum supply permanently at 721 million BLD — no more, no less. A hard cap changes the entire game: it introduces scarcity, strengthens game-theoretic incentives, and makes the asset fundamentally more attractive to new long-term holders.
Reduce staking rewards to ~2% annually.
High staking rewards at this stage are counterproductive. They incentivize passive accumulation followed by continuous selling. A lower reward rate preserves security while dramatically reducing structural sell pressure.
Address large-holder sell dynamics explicitly.
Large holders are already deeply profitable due to historical emissions. Continued selling at “pennies” undermines the network more than it helps. The goal should be to minimize liquid supply available for sale, allowing price discovery to happen under scarcity rather than dilution.
I respectfully disagree with the idea that we should “wait and see how Ymax performs” before making these changes. Waiting for usage alone may be the biggest risk. Usage should amplify a sound monetary structure — not compensate for a weak one.
A finite supply combined with lower emissions shifts BLD toward a game-theory- and demand-driven asset, where usage increases value instead of merely offsetting inflation. This is how we attract new capital, new holders, and serious long-term participants.
Utility is necessary — but utility without scarcity does not create durable value. Strong tokenomics and strong usage must evolve together, not sequentially.
This is a community-governed network. If we believe the current parameters are misaligned, now is the time to act, not after further dilution has already occurred.
I don’t really understand what huge profits you are talking about. 1% of the total staking mass currently brings in about $40 per week, and given the systematic decline in the total value of all stake, this does not cover the loss in any way.
I want to know the cost of subscription. If ymax will pay fees, users have to pay fixed amount in usd for access to ymax service. I am sure that Abad Mean will bring a lot of advanced DeFi users in ymax